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Abstract We defend a fitting-attitude (FA) theory of the funny against a set of
potential objections. Ultimately, we endorse a version of FA theory that treats
reasons for amusement as non-compelling, metaphysically non-conditional, and
alterable by social features of the joke telling context. We find that this version of
FA theory is well-suited to accommodate our ordinary practices of telling and being
amused by jokes, and helpfully bears on the related faultless disagreement dispute.

Our ordinary practices of telling and being amused by jokes have a normative
dimension. We criticize those who joke and laugh too much as buffoons, and those
who joke and laugh too little as bores. Similarly, we criticize some senses of humor
as crass or immature, and praise others as funny, or witty. To those who are amused
more than we are we might say ‘‘come on, it isn’t that funny,’’ and sometimes we
might protest ‘‘that’s not funny at all.’’ Any adequate theory of humor will have to
account for this normative dimension of our joke telling practices.
One way to account for this normative dimension is to appeal to evaluative
properties of the object of amusement. On this sort of view, the normativity of our
humor judgments derives from the goal of getting the object of amusement right.
We think that the most attractive view of this type is a version of fitting attitude
(FA) theory that holds that something is funny just in case it provides sufficient
reason, of the right kind, for an associated sentiment; here, comic amusement. Such
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theories are attractive, we think, because they aim to capture the normativity of our
humor practices without the metaphysical commitments of robust realism. The goal
of this paper is to defend an FA theory of the funny against a set of objections, and
thereby show that it is well suited to accommodate our ordinary practices of
amusing and being amused by jokes.

1 The Funny as a Fitting Attitude Property
To call something funny is in some way to endorse amusement at it, not to report or
predict it. The attraction of FA theory is that it purports to capture the sense that we
ought to be amused at certain things because they are funny.1
FA theories attempt to make sense of an evaluative property in terms of whether
an associated sentiment fits its object.2 Our focus here is on a class of FA theories
that hold that a sentiment fits its object if the object provides sufficient reason of the
right kind for a related sentiment.3 An FA theorist about the funny holds that a joke
is funny just in case comic-amusement is a fitting response to it.4 So, this sort of FA
theory is a species of a buck passing view5 as it ‘‘passes the buck’’ on giving an
account of an evaluative property to something else, here reasons for an associated
sentiment. But, the reasons must be of the right kind, i.e., they must be fit-relevant
reasons. This narrow focus on fit-relevant reasons is an acknowledgement of the socalled wrong kinds of reasons problem that has been something of a challenge for
various forms of neo-sentimentalism.6 Roughly, the problem is that in some cases
we have a reason to experience a sentiment that seems to have no bearing on the
related evaluative property. For instance, if Jerry Seinfeld were to hold a loaded
pistol to Sarah Silverman’s head and say sincerely ‘‘be amused, damn it!’’ surely
this threat is some reason for her to be amused, but not, the thinking goes, one that
bears on the matter at hand, namely whether Jerry Seinfeld is being funny.
FA theories are attractive because they preserve the realist normative gloss of
evaluative properties and the objective purport of our evaluative judgments, and so
are well situated to account for our practice of rendering comic judgments, as on this
view being funny is a matter of there being object-directed reasons of the right kind
for amusement. But they take evaluative properties to be mind-dependent and
anthropocentric, and so do not bring along with them the metaphysical
1

Jacobson (2011).

2

Early versions of fitting attitude theories were introduced by John McDowell and David Wiggins. See
McDowell (1998) and Wiggins (1987). For further influential discussion of neo-sentimentalist and fitting
attitude theories, see D’Arms and Jacobson (2000b, 2006). We also find a proto-FA theory in the work of
Berys Gaut, see Gaut (1998, p. 60).

3

The focus of this paper is a version of FA theory that gives an account of evaluative properties in terms
of fit-relevant reasons sufficient for an associated sentiment. There are other sorts of FA theory that are
not our focus here, cf., McHugh and Way (2016).

4

We use ‘amusement’ as shorthand for the more cumbersome ‘comic amusement,’ and as synonymous
with ‘mirth,’ which is currently in use in the sciences.

5

For a seminal account of so-called buck-passing views, see Scanlon (1998, esp. chapter 1).

6

D’Arms and Jacobson (2000a), Hieronymi (2005), Rabinowicz and Rönnow-Rasmussen (2004, 2006).
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commitments of a robust realism about the funny. Further, they do so in a way that
gives the sentiments, here amusement, a central role that respects the common
thought that properties like the funny are in some important way responsedependent.7

2 FA Theory and Divergent Senses of Humor
Though there is a lot to like about an FA theory of the funny, there is one aspect of
our humor practices that seems to be in tension with it: we are quite content to allow
for a wide range of divergence in senses of humor across individuals and social
groups. Adding to this is a growing body of evidence that shows that our responses
to jokes can be divided along cultural lines. The English, for example, prefer
‘‘deadpan or irreverent’’ jokes, while Americans like jokes that contain ‘‘insults or
veiled threats’’ (an empirically vindicated fact that likely surprises no one who has
been exposed to both groups).8 Further, when questioned about our own sense of
humor, we are often perfectly content to retreat to a subjective stance to explain it.9
We might find ourselves saying things like ‘‘I don’t know, I tend to like dark
humor,’’ or simply ‘‘I’m English.’’ Moreover, retreating to a more or less subjective
stance is not usually offered up as an explanation for why we are getting things
wrong (or right for that matter). And, in cases where a friend does not share our
sense of humor, say she does not go in for slapstick, while this might be something
to regret, it might seem more than a bit dogmatic to insist that that she has failed in
some meaningful sense to get things aright. That is, we might find ourselves
agreeing with Ted Cohen in thinking that though we want her to share in our sense
of humor, we cannot demand it of her as a rational agent.10
What we take to be relevant here is not the mere fact of divergence; we’ll find
divergence in all sentiments. Rather, it is our comfort with such divergence in most
contexts.11 For an FA theorist this feature of our humor practices poses something
of a challenge. If properties of the object provide reasons for amusement, how can
we square this with the ease with which we simply accept, as a perfectly normal part
of the practice of amusing and being amused, a fairly wide range of divergent
attitudes toward the objects of amusement?
Of course, an FA theorist might reject our comfort with divergent senses of
humor as wrong-headed, and insist that if something is funny, then in the absence of
countervailing reasons, we should be amused. But, to simply reject a wellentrenched practice on the grounds that it is inconsistent with the theory is
something that we should resist if we can. And, we suspect that many of those who
7

For some seminal articles presenting response dependent accounts of aesthetic properties, see Walton
(1993) and Goldman (1990). For a recent paper raising some criticisms of arguments supporting response
dependent accounts of aesthetic properties, see Watkins and Shelley (2012).

8

Weems (2014, esp., ch. 1).

9

John Bender claims that this is a feature of most third-party aesthetic disputes. See Bender (2005).

10

Cohen (1999, pp. 31–32).

11

Contrast moral contexts where comfort with divergence is less common.

123

1306

S. Patridge, A. Jordan

find themselves uncomfortable with talk of fit-relevant reasons for amusement are
so because of the sort of normativity that such talk seems to invite, namely that one
ought to be amused by some jokes.
We think that part of the hesitation about fit-relevant reasons for amusement
might arise from a common thought that something like what we call the reasons
rationality principle is true: if a person recognizes that (1) she has a reason to /, (2)
she has no competing reason to do something else, and (3) she has no weightier or
overriding reason to not /, then if she fails to / she is to this extent irrational; and if
she has a reason that she does not recognize as a reason, then she is to this extent
unreasonable.12 In either case, failing to do as the strongest reason bids is grounds
for rational criticism.13 This, however, seems inconsistent with our comfort with
divergent senses of humor cited above.
One possible option is for the FA theorist to say that reasons for amusement are
always very weak: though they yield oughts, they are of such a low magnitude that
we ignore them for most practical purposes. But, we suspect that this kind of move
won’t work. Some jokes merit uproarious laughter and heightened amusement,
while others only merit a minor chuckle and mild amusement. We presume that for
an FA theorist the most natural way to capture this is in terms of the strength of
reasons for amusement. When there are very strong reasons for amusement, then
heightened amusement is called for, say. But if this is right, then the FA theorist is in
the position of having to claim that reasons that are very strong in their amusingrelevant capacity are very weak in their capacity to yield oughts. This, at very least,
calls for explanation.
Another option is for the FA theorist to reject the reasons rationality principle
with regard to fit-relevant reasons for amusement. There are grounds for thinking
that the reasons rationality principle relies on an illegitimate assumption about
reasons, that all reasons have the same kind of normative force and any normative
difference amongst salient reasons is nothing more than a difference of strength.
Though a number of philosophers have endorsed such a conception of reasons,14
and it seems to underlie some philosophers’ rejection of the normativity of aesthetic
reasons altogether,15 there is a body of literature that challenges this notion. When it
comes to reasons there is more than one kind of normativity: some reasons entail
rational requirements, others do not.16 Margaret Little, for example, cites several
cases where an individual seems to have a reason to undertake an action yet is free
to do otherwise, even when she does so for no reason whatsoever. Some of the
examples that she cites are acts of heroic supererogation, weeding the garden, going
to the movies, and the selection of a particular color in a painting.17 In each case,
12

For more on the distinction between being unreasonable and irrational, see Scanlon, ibid.

13

We might add that the rational criticism could also be grounded in the strength of one’s amusement
response not fitting the strength of the reasons for amusement. If there are only weak reasons for
amusement, but one is overcome with a bout of amused delight, then one is also open to rational criticism.
14

Raz (2002), Robertson (2008), Kagan (1989) and Broome (2004).

15

Harold (2011).

16

For different accounts of non-compelling reasons see Dancy (2004) and Wallace (2013).

17

Little (2013).
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one might have a reason to undertake a particular action, say weed the garden as it is
overgrown, but one would be neither irrational nor unreasonable for failing to do so
even if one were to fail to do so simply because she cannot be bothered (that is, for
no countervailing reason at all, but only because she does not want to do as reason
dictates).18 Little uses these examples to draw a distinction between reasons whose
force compels agents, and reasons whose force does not compel but instead serves to
make an act intelligible or sensible. And, she claims, this is also true of some
attitudes and emotions. Sometimes an emotion is inconsistent with what a properly
functioning person would feel, and so one ought not to feel thusly. Sometimes it is
necessary to what a properly functioning person would feel, and so one ought to feel
thusly. But, sometimes it is merely consistent with what a properly functioning
person would feel, and so one may feel thusly or not.19 For example, it would be
wrong to feel anger over the racial integration of the public school system. And, it
might be that one ought to feel sorrow over a terrible tragedy. But, one may feel joy
after getting high marks on an exam, though one need not. Following this line of
thought, an FA theorist might claim that if a joke provides fit-relevant reasons for
amusement they are of the sort that makes amusement reasonable, but not required,
and so our failure to be amused is not all by itself an indication of any failing on our
part. A person who remained unamused by a funny joke would not, in any
meaningful sense, be getting things wrong.
Conceiving of fit-relevant reasons for amusement as non-compelling can also
accommodate our responses to divergent senses of humor, as there is no fit-relevant
sense in which we ought to be amused by a joke.20 Further, a fitting attitude view
that asserts that reasons for amusement are non-compelling can accommodate
claims like ‘‘that’s not funny!’’ or ‘‘it’s not that funny.’’ Even if reasons for
amusement are non-compelling, we will still be open to criticism in the case where
we take there to be a reason for amusement when there is no such reason, or in the
case where we take such a reason to be stronger than it is—say when we laugh a
little too uproariously. And, this way of thinking can capture the thought that one
might be a buffoon, as the buffoon takes there to be fit-relevant reasons when there
are none and she does so often. It might have a bit more difficulty capturing the
bore, as she fails to respond to the reasons that are there and we might think that if
the reasons do not compel then in what way can the bore be subject to evaluative
critique? To capture this sort of criticism, we might think that while it is fine to
ignore fit-relevant reasons for amusement in particular instances, a pattern of such
failure shows that we are unable to perceive such reasons at all. This is the failing of
the bore. For these reasons, we think that the FA theorist would do well to adopt a
non-compelling reasons model at least when it comes to the funny.

18

This recognition that different reasons have a different normative status is an interesting one because
we might be tempted to think that ignoring a reason because we can’t be bothered is a paradigm instance
of a rational failing.
19

Little, ibid, pp. 128–129.

20

It might do even better if conjoined with the recognition that there are a very large number of reasons
for amusement, and that most of us simply couldn’t possibly go in for all of them.
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3 Non-compelling Reasons and the Faultless Disagreement Debate
So far, our discussion has been guided by the observation that we tolerate a high
degree of divergence with regard to amusement preferences and responses. And this
has led us to endorse a non-compelling reasons version of FA theory with regard to
the funny. However, over the past decade or so a dispute has arisen about the
semantics of judgments of taste (which would include humor judgments) in light of
the thought that we don’t just tolerate divergence but that divergent judgements are
in fact faultless.21 That is, if A says that Jerry Seinfeld is funnier than Sarah
Silverman, while B says that the reverse is true, we might be tempted to say that
neither A’s nor B’s judgment is rationally mistaken. This, the thinking goes, is a
feature of all judgments of taste. But, realists, which for purposes of this debate
includes the FA theorist, have trouble accommodating mistake free, i.e., faultless,
divergence in judgment. After all, the realist seems to be committed to the claim that
at least one party to the dispute is saying something that is false. And, the realist’s
seeming inability to capture the faultlessness of judgments of taste has motivated
some to reject realism about aesthetic judgments altogether in favor of some version
of contextualism or relativism.
We readily admit that the non-compelling reasons model can’t capture the kind
of complete faultlessness sometimes presupposed in the faultless disagreement
debate. Even if we combine FA theory with non-compelling reasons, the FA theorist
is still committed to the claim that our humor judgments, which are based on
reasons, are at least sometimes mistaken, and hence not wholly faultless. Still, we
think that a non-compelling reasons version of FA theory can preserve a good
enough sense in which humor is faultless, call it practical faultlessness. Further, we
think that the sort of faultlessness that the FA theorist can preserve, i.e., practical
faultlessness, is preferable to the sort of faultlessness that is (mostly) at stake in the
faultless disagreement literature, call it doxastic faultlessness.
Let us begin by considering, in very broad outline,22 the main rival accounts to
realism about aesthetic judgments: contextualism and relativism. Contextualists
resolve the tension arising out of putative faultless disagreement by arguing that the
judgment of each disputant has an implied additional parameter. For example, A’s
judgment should be construed as ‘‘Jerry Seinfeld is funnier than Sarah Silverman (to
A)’’ and B’s as ‘‘Sarah Silverman is funnier than Jerry Seinfeld (to B).’’ In this way,
the contextualist can claim that each party is faultless, since each party to the
dispute asserts something true.23 Still, this sort of solution comes at a fairly high
21
The faultless disagreement debate has gone through several iterations and has reached a degree of
complexity that would take us too far afield for the issues at stake here. For a sampling of the arguments,
see Kölbel (2003), Macfarlane (2007), Schafer (2011), Egan (2014), Palmira (2015) and Baker and
Robson (2017).
22
We say ‘‘very broad outline’’ here to acknowledge that the literature on this debate is quite expansive,
and our comments here cannot do complete justice to it all. Still, we think that the version of FA theory on
offer here has a novel contribution to make to this debate which can be seen by treating the debate in
outline.
23
There are other more sophisticated ways of cashing out the contextualist position, but for purposes of
illustration this is sufficient.
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price: what we get in faultlessness we lose in genuine aesthetic disagreement, as on
this solution there is no real disagreement about the funniness of the comedian.
While it may sometimes be true that disagreement in humor judgments is only
apparent, we do not think that it is always so. That the contextualist’s solution cuts
substantively against our humor practices, we think counts against it.
The relativist takes her view to be preferable to both the realist, who has trouble
accommodating the faultlessness of humor judgments, and the contextualist, who
has trouble preserving the disagreement. The relativist argues that there is
disagreement because each party to the dispute asserts a content that contradicts
that asserted by the other party. But she further claims that this genuine
disagreement is faultless, because the truth conditions for assessing each utterance
is relativized to the perspective of each speaker.24 As a result, the relativist can
preserve some sense in which both parties disagree, as no one party could
simultaneously endorse both claims without contradiction, and also preserve the
sense in which neither party is making a mistake, since each party says something
true. Still, the relativist alternative requires jettisoning an attractive monadic
conception of truth, and this has given at least some philosophers pause.25 We think
that if we can avoid this unattractive consequence, we should.
So, we might think that we are left either without faultlessness, without
disagreement, or with the need to reject a monadic conception of truth, and that all
three are unfortunate consequences. But, we think that the version of FA theory that
we have developed thus far—one that sees humor-relevant reasons (and perhaps all
aesthetic reasons) as non-compelling—provides the realist a way of capturing
something that is very close to the faultlessness that motivates the faultless
disagreement dispute. If we are right, this will weaken the main motive for moving
from realism to its contextualist and relativist rivals.
Let us begin by noting that there are at least two ways that a disagreement might
said to be faultless.26 On the one hand, participants might be said to be doxastically
faultless. A person is doxastically at fault if there is something defective in their
belief, or in their belief forming process. And so, one will be doxastically faultless if
there is no such defect. On the other hand, participants might be said to be
practically faultless. A person is practically at fault if there is something wrong with
their actions or affective responses in the face of some input—a joke, say. And so,
one will be practically faultless if there is no such defect. The non-compelling
reasons account allows the FA theorist to capture the second kind of faultlessness,
though not the first. The guiding assumption of this paper is that people tolerate
broad divergence in amusement responses, that is, in what we find funny, in what
makes us chuckle, and in what sorts of humorous events we seek out. If someone
just doesn’t enjoy slapstick, it is a common thought that there isn’t anything wrong
24
There are different ways of cashing out the exact relation in the literature. We’ve chosen to follow
Kölbel’s ‘‘perspective’’ language for sake of simplicity. For the purposes of this paper, the precise details
don’t matter.
25

See e.g. Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009).

26

See Palmira, ibid., for a discussion of this distinction. We agree with Palmira that the datum of
apparent faultless disagreement has not been adequately specified and explored to provide support for any
of the views in the contextualism/realism/relativism debate.
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with this. So, we tolerate, or in the language of the faultless disagreement debate,
find faultless, divergent humor responses.
However, we are much less confident that we so easily tolerate doxastic
disagreement about humor judgments. In many cases at least, philosophers motivate
the thought that taste judgments are doxastically faultless by citing examples of
disagreements that have the following structure: pick two well-regarded practitioners in a particular genre—visual art say—and describe a case where one party says
that one master is better than the other, while the other party says the reverse. The
authors then announce that we find such disagreements faultless, and proceed to
consider how to make sense of this. For example, the leading case in Kölbel’s
‘‘Faultless Disagreement’’ is a dispute over whether Picasso or Matisse is the better
artist. For our part, we don’t find these sorts of disagreement faultless, so much as
we find them silly. Indeed, in Kölbel’s example we are inclined to say that both are
great artists, though great in different and perhaps incommensurable ways, and that
a serious dispute about which is the better master all-things-considered is at the very
least odd. Instead, we think that both parties to this dispute may be doxastically at
fault, because each makes the implicit assumption that the relevant artistic values
(however we are to make sense of evaluating artists) are likely to be commensurable
in a way that would allow for a sound all-things-considered comparative conclusion
regarding the merits of each. On this way of seeing the dispute, both parties would
be committed to something false.27
Further, we think that much of the literature on faultless disagreement
misrepresents the nature of our art-critical practices. These practices usually
involve much more complicated judgments about the relations between aesthetic
properties; how the aesthetic properties of a work combine to strengthen one
another, or undermine one another; how they are fixed by constraints of genre or art
form; and how the aesthetic properties relate to other contextual features, such as the
historical or political context. In these kinds of disputes, we are skeptical that
participants in the art-critical debate take each other’s claims to be doxastically
faultless. Indeed, we have witnessed many serious disputes about these sort of
matters. And, with regard to claims of this sort, we can easily imagine assertions
that are proper targets of ridicule. For example, if someone stated that the movie
Ironman was a sophisticated exploration of the ennui of the upper classes that
deserves serious attention and exploration, we would probably assume they were
making a joke. If we discovered that they weren’t, we would have serious doubts
about their aesthetic judgment. We think this provides a powerful reason to prefer
our approach, which is primarily focused on practical faultlessness, to an approach
that is focused primarily on doxastic faultlessness. Were someone to announce that
she enjoyed Ironman more than Moonlight, or that she’d rather see Ironman on
some particular occasion, this would be understandable. After all, some movies are
27
This possibility is often overlooked in the literature, but is compatible with the realist understanding of
such judgments (where realism is understood broadly to include mind-dependent theories that preserve
the objective purport of such claims). See e.g. Schafer, K. ibid. pp. 275–277 for a discussion of this point.
Baker and Robson attempt to capture a relevant sense in which people in a dispute like this would both be
saying something false, and faultless. See Baker, C. and Robson, J. ibid, especially Sect. 6. We don’t take
a stand on this issue here.
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affecting in a way that can be uncomfortable. If someone doesn’t go in for that sort
of thing, or does so only occasionally, that wouldn’t be a sound basis for criticism.
But, we also think that many taste judgements, including many all-in ones are not
doxastically faultless. For example, if one insisted that Ironman is a better cinematic
achievement than Moonlight, we would likely assume that they simply don’t know
much about cinema. Though, of course, we might find them epistemically faultless,
if we could not expect that they should have such knowledge. In such a case, they’d
be faultless in a sense, but still wrong.
Moreover, the buck-passing component of many contemporary FA theories
changes the terms of the debate over faultless disagreement insofar as a fullyinformed dispute would ultimately be a dispute over reasons, and not directly over
the property itself. This means that a fully informed disagreement concerning a
property attribution will, at root, be over one of three things: (1) whether some
consideration that putatively constitutes a reason obtains, e.g., whether the would-be
joke is a pun, (2) whether that consideration really is a reason in this context, e.g.,
whether the pun works to favor an associated attitude, (3) whether the reasons that
obtain, taken together, are sufficient to license the conclusory judgment that an
aesthetic property is properly attributed to the work, e.g., whether the reasons to be
amused are sufficient to warrant the amusement, and aren’t outweighed or otherwise
undercut. We suspect that once the issue is framed in terms of reasons rather than
all-in judgments much of the supposed doxastic faultlessness will turn out not to be
faultless at all. For example, if one party to the Matisse/Picasso dispute asserted
‘‘there are no reasons to see Matisse as a great artist’’ and the other insisted, on the
contrary, that there are such reasons, we’d be surprised to find that the disagreement
was faultless. Indeed, it strikes us that the former party would simply be wrong.
That said, there could be cases where we would want to accept either the
contextualist or the relativist story with regard to doxastic faultlessness. We are
open to there being different accounts of different sorts of judgments. Our primary
goal in this section has been to make two modest points. First, we hoped to clarify
that our claims are concerned with practical faultlessness, and not doxastic
faultlessness. We take practical fautlessness to be less controversial than doxastic
faultless, and we think it is something any story about the normativity of amusement
should account for. The FA theory that we’ve developed here can. Second, we claim
that practical faultlessness might account for much of the phenomenon of faultless
disagreement. We suspect that if there are doxastically faultless disagreements, they
are much rarer than many participants in the faultless disagreement debate assume,
and certainly don’t cover such a broad class of judgments as aesthetic judgments, or
even judgments of taste. If we are right, then the non-compelling reasons account
provides a way for the realist to avoid the contextualist/relativist challenge, and
accommodate a kind of faultless divergence with regard to our humor responses.28
28
We should emphasize that we would not be inclined to accept a one size fits all account for all disputes
about matters of taste. For instance, in some cases we think that the contextualist is right, and we ought to
understand putative disagreements as really being statements about subjective preferences. We suspect
that adult users of English do this commonly with pure gustatory ‘‘disagreements’’ e.g. over flavors of ice
cream.
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Before moving on, we note that the proposal we have developed thus far is not
the only attempt to preserve realism is the face of faultless disagreement by
recharacterizing the relevant kind of faultlessness. Karl Schafer argues that realists
can accommodate at least one sense in which two parties to a dispute over a matter
of taste are faultless.29 Specifically, he argues that each party to a dispute over a
matter of taste can be faultless in the sense that each is acting rationally in the face
of her prior aesthetic experiences. As such, each could be forming her beliefs in
accordance with good norms for aesthetic belief formation. In such a case, each
party is faultless for having the belief that she has in the narrow sense that each is
responding properly to her own aesthetic experiences. But nevertheless, at least one
of the disputants will believe something false. Our view, however, has one
advantage over Schafer’s. Schafer’s doesn’t adequately distinguish judgments of
taste from other kinds of judgments. That is, Schafer’s faultlessness could just as
easily be applied to just about any judgment, and does not explain the supposed
distinctive way that we might think that judgments of taste are faultless. That is, for
just about any judgment, there are conditions where there can be disagreement
between two parties, where each party is wholly without fault in the sense that each
is responding rationally to her available evidence. So, Schafer’s account hasn’t
captured anything distinctive of judgments of taste. But, the motivating intuition
was that judgments of taste are faultless in a way that at least many other beliefs are
not.30 Thinking of the relevant faultlessness in terms of non-compelling reasons,
however, allows us to capture something that does relevantly distinguish judgments
of taste from many other kinds of judgments. For this reason, the FA theory that
we’ve developed thus far has an advantage over Schafer’s.31

4 Inside Jokes and the Reasons–Property Relation
Having argued that fit-relevant reasons for amusement are best conceived of as noncompelling, and having highlighted some of the implications that this account
would have for the faultless disagreement debate, we’d like to turn our attention to
the social dimension of joke telling as it too might be thought to challenge FA
accounts of humor. Many instances of joking involve a kind of social contingency
which might be thought to cut against FA accounts of the funny insofar as FA
theories try to preserve the objective purport of aesthetic property ascriptions. Social
contingency might be thought to be at odds with this objectivity. This social
contingency is most evident with the phenomenon of inside jokes, so it is to those
that we now turn. To help motivate this discussion consider the following proofsthat-p jokes.
Davidson’s proof that p: Let us make the following bold conjecture: p.
Wallace’s proof that p: Davidson has made the following bold conjecture: p.
29

Schafer, K. ibid.

30

For a discussion of this point, see Palmira, ibid, especially 362–364.

31

Of course, it is a view that is wholly compatible with Schafer’s account. And we agree that his account
might capture some relevant sense in which divergent judgments of taste can be faultless.
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Putnam’s proof that p: Some philosophers have argued that not-p, on the grounds
that q. It would be an interesting exercise to count all the fallacies in this
‘‘argument’’. (It’s really awful, isn’t it?) Therefore, p.
Lewis’ proof that p: Most people find the claim that not-p completely obvious and
when I assert p they give me an incredulous stare. But the fact that they find notp obvious is no argument that it is true; and I do not know how to refute an
incredulous stare. Therefore, p.
Anscombe’s proof that p: But if someone really thinks, in advance, that it is open
to question whether p, I do not want to argue with him; he shows a corrupt mind.
Therefore, p.
Plato’s proof that p:
SOCRATES: Is it not true that p?
GLAUCON: I agree.
CEPHALUS: It would seem so.
POLEMARCHUS: Necessarily.
THRASYMACHUS: Yes, Socrates.
ALCIBIADES: Certainly, Socrates.
PAUSANIAS: Quite so, if we are to be consistent.
ARISTOPHANES: Assuredly.
ERYXIMACHUS: The argument certainly points that way.
PHAEDO: By all means.
PHAEDRUS: What you say is true, Socrates.32
Proofs-that-p jokes are paradigm instances of inside jokes. Inside jokes are
distinctive in that they are told by and for a select group of people—here analytic
philosophers. Such jokes tend to ensure their inside status by trading on traits that
are common to members of a particular group such as specific knowledge,
experiences, and even evaluative commitments.33 Proofs-that-p jokes rely on highly
specialized knowledge of the practice of analytic philosophy, such as the distinctive
personalities and argumentative styles of some famous philosophers, and the belief
that there is something not quite above board about these modes of argumentation.
In this way, they are conditional. And, this might seem a perfectly ho-hum fact
about jokes. After all, as Ted Cohen points out, all jokes are in some sense
conditional. For example, to be amused by a pun, perhaps the simplest joke form,
you don’t need much, but you do need a certain facility with the respective
language.34 So, the thinking goes, all jokes are conditional. Some are more so than
others. Inside jokes are just extreme examples of this very ordinary fact about jokes.
Still, we might wonder how exactly the conditionality of jokes bears on the reasons–
32

These jokes are taken from David Chalmer’s website. Retrieved March 26, 2017 from http://consc.net/
misc/proofs.html; and a comment thread on Feminist Philosophers. Retrieved March 26, 2017 from http://
feministphilosophers.wordpress.com/2012/01/04/proofs-that-p-from-women-philosophers/.

33

Both Ted Cohen and Ronald de Sousa distinguish between jokes that rely only on shared knowledge
between teller and hearer, and those that rely on something like shared evaluative commitments. Cohen
calls the former hermetic and the latter affective; de Sousa refers to the former under the category of wit
and the latter as phthonic. Here we avoid taking a stand on how to properly categorize proofs-that-p jokes.
34

Cohen, ibid, pp. 12–32.
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property relationship claimed by FA theory, particularly when it comes to inside
jokes.
What should an FA theorist say about the apparent fact that inside jokes are in
some significant way conditional? The worry is that the social conditionality of
inside jokes seems to cut against the objective purport of our humor practices
presumed by FA theorists. Inside jokes, we might think, are designed to ensure that
only certain kinds of folks will be amused. What we think the FA theorist must say
about the apparent social contingency is that it arises out of the need to have a
certain kind of knowledge to understand the joke. Those who do not possess
relevant knowledge sufficient to get the joke are unable to see the evaluative
property. They are, strictly speaking, unreasonable with regard to the fit-relevant
reasons for amusement, but we won’t hold this against them. We think that this is
the most promising option for the FA theorist because it preserves the sense in
which inside jokes are tailored for a particular audience and the objective purport of
our humor judgments even with regard to inside jokes.

5 The Social Dimensions of Inside Joking Events
Now that we have a better understanding of what an FA theorist should say about
fit-relevant reasons—they are non-compelling and metaphysically non-conditional
(though they are epistemically so)—we’d like to return to our proofs-that-p jokes to
explore other ways in which the social features of our actual practices of telling and
being amused by inside jokes bear on judgments of the funny. To get at these
features, we’d like to consider why we tell inside jokes to one another. One answer
is that we are trying to tell funny jokes that we expect that only insiders will get.
This may in part be true, but we think that there is something more fundamental to
our inside joking. Like other philosophers of humor before us, we think that inside
jokes are best seen as a social phenomenon that primarily serves the end of social
communication and bonding.35 In telling and receiving these sorts of jokes with
laughter that signals amusement36 we affirm our status as members of a common
group and thereby build a common bond. The teller, in assuming the recipient will
get the joke and be amused, signals that the recipient is like her; the recipient, in
laughing, similarly affirms the joke-teller and completes the bond.37
Proofs-that-p jokes serve to highlight something odd about the discipline and
ourselves as members: while we philosophers tend think of ourselves as part of the
most rationally rigorous discipline in the humanities—as members of a discipline in
which the best argument tends to carry the day—these jokes expose us as biased,
and as, at least at times, reliant on weak (or even no!) rational argumentation,
particularly when it comes to defending a pet theory. The more famous one is, the
35

See Cohen (1999, pp. 28–29), Carroll (2014, p. 85) and De Sousa (1987).

36

There are two kinds of laugher, Duchenne and non-Duchenne only one of which signals genuine
amusement, Duchenne. See Brown and Schwartz (1980).
37
Still, we agree with Peter Kivy that such jokes also affirm others’ status as outsiders. We think that this
fact raises interesting issues worthy of further examination. See Kivy (2003).
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more she can get away with such moves. So, though each individual joke has a
particular butt, say Plato, the real butt is the discipline itself and hence ourselves as
members. We philosophers are not always as rational as we hold ourselves to be.
We think that this is why proofs-that-p jokes tend to be told in clusters, as extended
joke-telling events where we trade joke-types, and not as stand-alone jokes.38 In
light of this, our amusement seems partly responsive to the social dynamics that are
at play, such as: being amused at these jokes is an enjoyable joint activity, in making
fun of ourselves we bond with others, and those with whom we want to form a
common bond are also amused.
How might an FA theorist handle these sorts of social features of inside jokes?
We think that FA theorists might see these sorts of social dynamics as reasons to be
amused—that our being amused by proofs-that-p jokes will help to build a common
bond is a genuine reason to be amused—but not as fit-relevant ones—they don’t
bear on whether the joke is funny. Of course, more would need to be said about why
this is. One answer might be to claim that fit-relevant reasons for amusement are
object-directed, and here the relevant object of amusement is a joke, which is
properly specified in terms of something like its logical structure and representational content. Since social features of the inside joke-telling context are not part of
the joke they do not bear on the discussion at hand—whether or not a proof-that-p
joke is funny. Still, some philosophers claim that jokes conceived of in this way are
not the bearers of evaluative properties at all,39 or at least not primarily.40 Abstract
joke types are not funny; tellings are.
However we settle this dispute, everyone agrees that different tellings of the same
joke can have different evaluative properties. Some tellings are funny, and some are
not. This is due not to features of the joke type, but of the tokening. Might the
recognition that joke tokens of the same type can have different evaluative
properties open the door to the kind of social dynamics that we described earlier?
Maybe not, as the FA theorist might claim that there are two objects of amusement,
jokes and tellings. A telling is a combination of properties of the joke type—e.g.,
logical structure, representational content, and relevant incongruity—and its
utterance—e.g., cadence, timing, facial expression, and body language. It is
features of the telling that are responsible for the differences that we find amongst
the evaluative properties of joke tokens. Nevertheless, if the social features of the
joke telling context are not part of the relevant object of amusement, the telling, they
are irrelevant to its funniness. On this way of conceiving things, social features of
the joke telling context are wrong kinds of reasons for amusement, if indeed they are
reasons for amusement at all.
Still, the issue at hand may not be settled quite so easily, as we might reframe the
question thusly: might considerations that are neither part of the joke, nor how it is
38
Of course, we can imagine a situation that might call for the telling of only one proof-that-p joke, say if
we were attending a talk by Putnam. But, in such a case, the hearer must be acquainted with proof-that-p
jokes. Otherwise, she will likely experience confusion or misread the teller as deriding the speaker. All of
this operates, we believe, to defang the jokes. Since the butts are proxies for us insiders, they are less
mean-spirited than an outsider might think.
39

Carroll (2015, p. 243).

40

Gaut, ibid, pp. 53–54.
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delivered affect how funny it is? For example, in the bar, after the day’s conference
presentations, we might find ourselves trading knock–knock jokes, elephant jokes,
dead baby jokes, or non-sense jokes. And, we might find ourselves quite amused by
at least some of them. If pushed, no doubt, we will acknowledge that the jokes
themselves are bad, but this does not seem to alter the fact that we are amused by
them in this social context. Imagine, for example, how we’d respond if an outsider
approached us and said ‘‘hey, you know those jokes are not funny, right?’’ We doubt
that we’d be much put off our activity. And, our amusement in such cases suggests
that we find the jokes as they are told in this social context funny. We think that this
point is further supported by the fact that laughter causes amusement, both in others
and in ourselves. So, when everyone is laughing, we’ll laugh, and thereby become
even more amused. And, we think, this is a perfectly normal feature of joke-telling,
and not something to be explained away. So, we might think that features that go
beyond properties of the joke and its telling narrowly conceived—e.g., representational content, cadence, timing, relevant incongruity—such as contextual
matters—e.g., the social dynamics at play—are implicated in our amusement in a
way that bears on our ascriptions of the funny. To claim otherwise is to simply
disregard too much of our amusement practice. And, we think that proofs-that-p
jokes, when told, work this way as well: part of why we find them funny is
explained by the social dynamics at play—that is, by what the telling is doing
socially.
One way for an FA theorist to accommodate the social dimensions of inside jokes
is to see them as a supplement to an FA theory of the funny. For example, an FA
theorist might conceive of the activity of telling inside jokes primarily in terms of
the successful navigation of a social context, rather than the telling of funny jokes.
This way of thinking about inside jokes might be thought to gain support from the
thought that in telling proofs-that-p jokes it is not clear that we find the joke in
question funny; instead we might affirm the activity of joking by being amused.
When everyone is laughing, everyone is bonding, and everyone is enjoying
themselves, the further question ‘‘but are these jokes funny?’’ even if cogent, might
sometimes be beside the point of what’s going on. Remember our outsider who
helpfully points out that our jokes are bad. On this view, in a social context, it may
not be clear if we are responding to the successful navigation of a social context, or
fit-relevant reasons for amusement. Sometimes our amusement is a recognition that
a joke is funny. Sometimes that we are involved in an enjoyable social activity. And,
sometimes it is both. In any case, contextual features of the joke-telling context play
a central role in our joke telling practices; they just are not reasons to see the jokes,
even as told in this context, as funny, or at least so an FA theorist might say.
Still, this way of thinking about things leaves us in the somewhat unhappy
position of claiming that when we think that an otherwise bad joke is funny, say
when we are riffing on a theme, we are wrong. While those who are ‘‘in the grip’’ of
a certain way of thinking about FA theory may want to insist that the kinds of social
dynamics that we’ve tried to make visible here are paradigm instances of wrong
kinds of reasons, and so in the cases that we cite here the participants are either
wrong in thinking that they find it funny, or they are wrong in their assessment of
the joke as funny in the relevant context. And, nothing we have said here rules this
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out. But, our task is to see if FA theory can make good on its promise to provide an
account of the funny that is largely consistent with our actual humor practices. The
FA theorist is free to insist that we would be wrong to think that our otherwise bad
jokes are funny or that our proofs-that-p jokes are funnier when told in a particular
context, but we think that this is something that we should avoid if we can.
We think that the social dimensions of inside jokes can be accommodated as part
of an FA theory of the funny. Elsewhere we’ve argued that FA theory can
accommodate the moral features of jokes by treating them not as reasons, but as
conditions that enable or disable, and strengthen or weaken fit-relevant reasons for
amusement.41 For example, we might treat the immorality of a joke as a disabling
condition that undercuts the normative status of fit-relevant reasons for amusement
that might otherwise obtain.42 We think that the social dynamics of inside jokes
might similarly be brought into an FA theory by conceiving them as enabling
conditions that take features of the joke that wouldn’t otherwise provide fit-relevant
reasons for amusement, and make them be reasons. On this way of construing
things, the kinds of social dynamics mentioned above are salient normative
considerations—they enable or disable, and we might add strengthen or weaken—
fit-relevant reasons. But, they are not fit-relevant reasons themselves, and so do not
run into the wrong kinds of reasons problem. Fit-relevant reasons are objectdirected; enabling conditions are reason-directed.

6 Is the Relationship Between a Joke and Amusement a Reason-Giving
One?
Despite the work that we’ve done here to spell out an account of fit-relevant reasons
for amusement that can better accommodate our actual practices of joking and being
amused, some will still harbor the suspicion that the relationship between a joke and
amusement isn’t a reason-giving one; it is merely causal. We think that some
evaluative properties are a better fit for an FA theory than others, and we are
comfortable with the possibility that different evaluative properties will have
different theoretic accounts. For example, we do not think that the disgusting is a fitrelevant property. To see why, consider the following example: someone points out
that the pencil you are holding is covered in a thin layer of feces. Upon finding this
out, you’ll likely find the pencil disgusting. We might be tempted to think that we
now have a fit-relevant reason to be disgusted, i.e., the pencil is covered in feces.
But, it is worth noting that here it is feces that is the object of disgust. We’ve been
factually corrected about the state of the pencil, which triggered our antecedent
disgust response. But, how might we reply to the question ‘‘why should I be
disgusted by feces?’’ Is there a candidate fit-relevant reason that we might cite? We
might point out that there are germs in it that might make one sick. But, this is
certainly a wrong kind of reason, as it bears on whether it would be beneficial to feel
41

Jordan and Patridge (2012).

42

Assuming that this sort of counter-factual reasoning is valid. For an argument that it is not, see
Jacobson (1997, p. 193).
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disgust and not on whether the object is disgusting. One common feature of wrong
kinds of reasons is that they tend to be inert in relation to whether we feel the
sentiment.43 Finding out that feces causes disease is unlikely to bring one to be
disgusted, even if it will cause us to avoid the pencil. So, on this admittedly quick
picture, our disgust responses do not appear to be reason-responsive in any
meaningful way. One natural explanation of this is that there aren’t fit-relevant
reasons for disgust.
Is amusement like disgust? Here things look less clear. Imagine that you tell a
George W. Bush joke that your friend doesn’t find funny. After some discussion,
you find out that she doesn’t know that Bush is famous for his malapropisms. Now
she gets the joke, and might even come to be at least somewhat amused. Have we
found a fit-relevant reason for amusement? Perhaps, but it is worth noting that as in
the feces case, she’s been factually corrected. What we’ll want to know is whether
this correction has allowed us to see a reason that we didn’t before, or whether it
merely triggered an antecedent amusement related disposition. If our guiding cases
show us only that we’ve misunderstood the facts—e.g., that the pencil is covered in
feces, or that W. is famous for his malapropisms—it is not clear if our antecedent
sentimental dispositions have been triggered, or if we are now in a position to see a
reason-giving relationship between the joke and amusement. To make progress here
it would help to have a case where someone explains the reason-giving relationship
that obtains between a joke and amusement. But, if after our friend gets the W. joke
she isn’t amused, how might we bring her to see that the joke is funny? We, at least,
are not sure how to do this except by restating the relevant facts or pointing to the
evaluative property. E.g., ‘‘you know, Bush is famous for having a rather strained
relationship with the English language, and the joke trades on that. It is making light
of his inarticulateness. Come on, it’s funny.’’ And, one might worry that this is
exactly what we’d expect if in articulating putative reasons for amusement, we
weren’t really giving reasons at all, but, like with disgust, we were laying out the
causes of our own amusement. It is one thing to talk abstractly about fit-relevant
reasons for amusement, it is an altogether different thing to convince us that there
are such reasons.
Still, we think that an FA theory has enough going for it that, absent a rival theory
that does just as well at making sense of the apparent normative dimensions of our
joking practices, we should be FA theorists at least with respect to jokes. The
promise of FA theory is to preserve the realist normative gloss of evaluative
properties and the objective purport of our evaluative judgments, without the
metaphysical commitments of robust realism, and to do so in a way that respects the
thought that they are in some important sense response-dependent and anthropocentric. Our aim has been to think through a set of potential objections to an FA
theory of the funny in order to determine whether or not it is well suited to
accommodate our ordinary practices of amusing and being amused by jokes. In so
doing, we’ve argued that an adequate account of fit-relevant reasons for amusement
43
A similar point can be made about wrong kinds of reasons for belief—that is, reasons for belief that
don’t bear on the truth of the belief. Learning that it is good to believe a falsehood does not in any way
contribute to our believing it. In contrast, bona fide evidentiary reasons do. See Hieronymi, ibid.
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is one that treats them as non-compelling, metaphysically non-conditional, and
alterable by social features of the joke telling context (and, as we’ve argued
elsewhere, by moral considerations). In the end, we think that FA theory has enough
going for it that, absent a rival theory that does just as well at making sense of the
normative dimensions of our joking practices, we should be FA theorists at least
with regard to jokes.
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